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Abstract
Is resource abundance a blessing or a curse? Typically, in resource rich countries, domestic fuel prices 
are lower, and energy intensity of GDP is higher. But they have higher investment in R&D and fixed 
capital stock, larger foreign exchange reserves and more inflows of FDI. They also have lower budget 
deficits and lower inflation. These are conducive for long term growth. We also find that in resource 
rich countries, real exchange rate is generally higher, accumulation of human capital is slower and 
institutions are worse, especially if they were not strong initially, which are detrimental for growth.
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Victor Polterovich, Vladimir Popov, and Alexander Tonis
“So here’s my prediction: You tell me the price of oil, and I’ll tell you what kind of Russia you’ll have. If 
the price stays at $60 a barrel, it’s going to be more like Venezuela, because its leaders will have plenty 
of money to indulge their worst instincts, with too few checks and balances. If the price falls to $30, it 
will be more like Norway. If the price falls to $15 a barrel, it could become more like America—with 
just enough money to provide a social safety net for its older generation, but with too little money to 
avoid developing the leaders and institutions to nurture the brainpower of its younger generation.”
[Will Russia Bet on Its People or It’s Oil Wells?–Thomas L. Friedman, 
New York Times, February 16, 2007]
“How do we know that the God loves the Arabs? If he didn’t, why would He give them all the oil?”
[American folklore]
It seems that a country endowed with larger quantities of natural resources has an advantage and (other con-
ditions being similar) has to grow faster than resource poor countries. This is not exactly the case, however. 
Between 1960 and 1990 the per capita incomes of resource poor countries grew two to three times faster 
than the per capita income of resource abundant countries, and the gap in the growth rates appears to widen 
with time (Sachs and Warner, 1999; Auty, 2001). This surprising phenomenon became a subject of inten-
sive research, both empirical and theoretical. A large number of papers have been published in recent years 
supporting the “resource curse” thesis and effects that may inhibit growth in resource rich economies. Several 
recent papers, however (Alexeev and Conrad, 2005; Stijns, 2005; Brunnschweiler, 2006), question the mere 
existence of the “resource curse” and make it necessary to reconsider the hypotheses about the impact of 
resource abundance on economic growth.
Even without rigorous calculations, it is obvious that not all resource rich countries failed. “Thirty 
years ago, Indonesia and Nigeria—both dependent on oil—had comparable per capita incomes. Today, 
Indonesia’s per capita income is four times that of Nigeria. A similar pattern holds true in Sierra Leone and 
Botswana. Both are rich in diamonds. While Botswana averaged 8.7% annual economic growth over the 
past thirty years, Sierra Leone plunged into civil strife.” (Stiglitz, 2004). Norway, where large oil deposits 
were detected in the seventies, was able to avoid Dutch Disease consequences (Gylfason, 2001). Moreover, 
Norway increased its PPP GDP per capita very significantly, leaving behind its neighbours, and almost 
catching up with the USA.
Thus, the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth is not clear-cut; it could 
be either positive or negative. It is also possible that resource abundance has no significant impact on 
economic growth, in the absence of other complementary factors. As a matter of fact, searching for growth 2  DESA Working Paper No. 93
promoting factors remains largely illusive.1 The aim of this paper is to draw a statistical portrait of a typi-
cal resource abundant country and to establish basic stylized facts and relationships before arguing about 
causation. We run cross country regressions that do not deal with endogeneity problem. Hence, our results 
have to be considered as preliminary, and our conclusions have to be checked using panel data, covering a 
longer period.
Our empirical investigation shows that resource abundant countries have on average:
lower budget deficits; • 
Lower inflation; • 
higher foreign exchange reserves; • 
higher inflows of FDI;  • 
lower domestic fuel prices;  • 
higher investment/GDP ratio;  • 
lower income inequality. • 
However, resource abundance is also associated with
higher RER; • 
distortions of domestic prices; • 
high energy intensity; • 
weaker institutions, if they were poor to begin with;  • 
slower accumulation of human capital. • 
Thus, there seem to be both growth enhancing and growth retarding factors that can make resource 
abundance a blessing or a curse. The next section provides a brief review of literature on the role of natural 
resources in economic growth. Explanations of the tendency for natural resource abundance to immiserise 
growth and development (the “resource curse”) have traditionally followed four approaches: the “Dutch dis-
ease” thesis, the “volatility effect”, the “rent-seeking” effect, and the “false security” or “overconfidence effect”.
1  Serious methodological concerns are raised regarding the specifications used for estimating the growth 
effects of one or another growth enhancing variable, in both the cross country and country specific 
studies. Although most of the studies claim that they are estimating the permanent long run growth 
effects, there is no distinction between the permanent long run and the transitory short run growth effects 
of variables. The dependent variable is usually the annual growth rate of GDP (or per capita GDP) in 
the country specific time series studies or its 5-year average in the cross country studies. Neither of the 
annual or 5-yearly average growth rates can said to be a good proxy for the unobservable long run growth 
rate in the steady state. When perturbed, a time span of 5 years is too short for an economy to attain the 
steady state. Simulations with the closed form solutions show that an economy takes a few decades to 
converge anywhere close to its steady state. This transition period may be more than 50 years even for 
small perturbations; see Sato (1963) and Rao (2006). The short run growth rates are also important for the 
policy makers especially of the developing countries because they persist for more than 5-years and will 
have permanent level effects (Rao and Cooray, 2009). Many studies also claim that their specifications are 
based on one or another endogenous growth model, but it is hard to understand how their specifications 
are derived from the claimed endogenous growth model. Commenting on the unsatisfactory nature 
of specifications in many such empirical works, Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) have noted that 
“This literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from theory, 
which often means there are more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample.” 
Consequently, as found by Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005), the number of potential growth 
improving variables used in various empirical works is as many as 145. Given these reservations it is hard 
to select a few uncontroversial control variables to estimate the growth effects of any particular variable, 
such as aid or institutions.Resource abundance: A curse or blessing?          3
Review of the literature
Several explanations for the “resource curse” have been offered in the literature. The first explanation, sug-
gested by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950), is known as Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. They pointed to a 
tendency for primary goods prices to decline relatively to prices of manufactured goods, and suggested that 
the share of primary goods in GDP will diminish due to technical progress2. Therefore countries relying on 
primary goods sector have to grow slower than economies relying on manufacturing industries. Prebisch and 
his followers (“structuralists”) recommended that developing countries temporary close their economies to 
fully develop manufacturing industries.
There are two major objections to Prebisch-Singer (PS) hypothesis, however. First, a number of 
recent studies used modern econometric technique to demonstrate that PS- hypothesis holds not for all 
primary goods, and not for all periods (Kelard and Wohar, 2002). Second, few, if any, attempts to follow 
Prebisch’s advice proved to be successful.
An earlier export based theory of resource-driven growth was suggested by Innis (1954), Baldwin 
(1956) and Hirschman (1977) (see also Auty and Kiiski, 2001). Innis developed a “staple theory of economic 
development” arguing that countries, in particular Canada, had grown and developed into an integrated econ-
omy through exports of primary products. Other scholars studied economic histories of a number of developed 
and developing countries and demonstrated that primary resource sector influenced positively or negatively 
their economic growth depending on its linkages with other sectors. These linkages are defined by technologies 
of the resource extraction. In some cases, development of resource sector stimulates the rise of industries that 
supply its inputs (backward linkage), and industries that process the staple products prior to export (forward 
linkage). Due to these and other linkages an economy gradually diversifies. However, the diversification does 
not take place if the linkages are weak (when, for example, inputs are supplied from abroad). In this case pro-
duction concentrates in the resource sector that has little contact with the rest of the economy. The country falls 
into a staple trap. Historical studies of many resource abundant countries show that the Staple Trap Theory, 
while being useful, has a limited explanatory power since it does not take into account the role of macroeco-
nomic and political economy variables (Findlay and Lundahl, 2001; Abidin, 2001; Gylfason, 2001).
The “Dutch Disease” story is another possible mechanism of resource curse. Assume a resource 
boom—a sudden windfall gain. This may be associated with a temporary increase in the price of oil or 
natural resource discoveries. Resource boom seems to open a window of opportunity—a possibility to start 
a catching up process—for a developing country. However, market forces may not lead an economy in the 
right direction. The resource boom causes a currency appreciation or a rise in relative prices of non-tradables, 
and a rise in wages, leading to a decline in competitiveness, and hence an increase in imports. The rise in the 
relative price of non-tradables, thus causes resources to shift towards non-tradables (due to higher prices) and 
expenditure switches to tradables (due to lower prices). Assuming full-employment, wages in non-tradables 
rise, which also pushes the wages in tradables. This is the source of the decline in competitiveness of trad-
ables and hence their decline. If there are learning by doing effects or positive externalities from human capi-
tal accumulation in the tradable sectors and not in the resource extraction sector, then resource boom may 
have negative effect on long run economic growth (Corden and Neary, 1982; Krugman, 1987; Matsuyama, 
1992; Auty, 2001, Ch. 7).3
2  Bhagwati (1958) showed that growth in foreign countries as a result of the spread of new technologies 
abroad could reduce welfare of the country exporting these technologies by reducing its terms of trade.
3  This phenomenon is known as Dutch Disease since it was clearly observed in the Netherlands in the 1960-
80s, after the giant Groningen gas field was discovered in 1959.4  DESA Working Paper No. 93
Another example of market failure explanation is the “overshooting model”. Rodriguez and Sachs 
(1999) argued that resource abundant economies tend to have higher, not lower levels of GDP per capita 
with respect to resource poor countries. They introduce a factor of production which (like oil) expands more 
slowly than labour and capital into a Ramsey model and show that the economy demonstrates overshooting 
effect. The economy surpasses its steady state level of income in finite time and then comes back to its steady 
state, displaying negative rate of growth. Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model, authors 
show that Venezuelan negative growth path in 1972-1993 may be explained by their theory. A shortcoming 
of the Rodriguez-Sachs approach, however, is that it does not explain why the steady state is not moving fast 
enough to catch up with developed economies. One can try to construct an endogenous growth model to 
take into account technical progress as well as institutions and to continue this line of research.
The Dutch Disease theory explains macroeconomic consequences of a resource boom, whereas the 
Rodriguez-Sachs approach implies that the economy is not able to adjust in an optimal way to the shock of 
discovery of resource deposits. Market failure is actually at the heart of both explanations. A question arises, 
however, if a government is able to correct it.
For a country that tries to avoid the overvaluation of the currency as a result of a resource boom, 
there seem to be two extreme policy responses. In the first case, a country keeps the real exchange rate of its 
currency low enough by accumulating assets abroad (foreign exchange reserves) and getting low but reliable 
interest income. This used to be the policy of Norway and a number of other countries. To an extent, this 
seems to be the current policy of the Russia, which accumulated large foreign exchange reserves (nearly $600 
billion by mid 2008), although this accumulation was not enough to prevent the real appreciation of the 
ruble. The second type of policy implies the reallocation of the income flows to stimulate development of the 
manufacturing sector and infrastructure.
The first policy is secure, but can have significant opportunity cost for a developing country in terms 
of lost opportunity to build-up infrastructure and a universal social protection system. The second policy 
could give a chance to diversify national economy, so it is less dependent on the world resource prices. But 
this policy requires good administration and good coordination of government and business efforts. Besides, 
a range of mixed policies may be considered. One can try to find an optimal mixture of reserve accumulation 
and industrial policy.
Another strand of the modern literature emphasizes government failure story—political economy 
aspects of a resource boom. Revenues from resources increase so drastically that investments into rent seek-
ing to capture the resource control turn out to be much more profitable than investments into production. 
Lobbing, dishonest competition, corruption flourish, hampering economic growth (Auty, 1997; Sachs and 
Warner, 1999a, b; Bulte, Damania, Deacon, 2003). This is why attempts to use resource sector profit for in-
dustrial policy projects were unsuccessful in many countries. Governments taxed primary resource producers 
and invested the money into priority industries. However, most projects failed due to selection of industries 
influenced by non-economic factors, such as lobbying or cronyism. There is also evidence of deteriorating 
human capital and increased inequality.
Government failure can be rampant when institutional quality is poor. Low quality of institutions 
is analyzed in Leamer et al. (1998), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Gylfason (2004), Stijns (2005), 
whereas Gylfason (2001), Suslova and Volchkova (2006) provide explanations and evidence of deterioration 
of human capital in resource rich countries.Resource abundance: A curse or blessing?          5
Thus, there seems to be a dilemma here: market failure requires government intervention, but low 
institutional quality results in government failure. The question is why some resource rich countries do not 
use their windfall gains in improving institutions. Based on regression analysis, the next section provides a 
statistical profile of resource rich countries. It is hoped that this profile will shed some light into the complex 
interplay of factors that may result in either a resource curse or a resource blessing for a country.
Regression analysis and statistical portrait
Data
We used World Development Indicators (WDI) for data on growth rates, inflation, budget deficits, reserve ac-
cumulation, price levels, energy intensity, R&D expenditure, tariffs, income inequalities, etc. for about 100 
countries for the period of 25 years (1975–99). Also, WDI contains data on the share of fuel in exports and 
mineral rent. Most of the data are generally for the period 1975-99 or a similar period with several exceptions. 
Data on income inequalities are for the latest available year of 1993-2003 period—they are taken from World 
Development Indicators, 2006, table 2.8 (http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Section2.htm).
For the indicators of the institutional capacity we used average corruption perception index for 
1980-1985, CPI, from Transparency International and various indices of the World Bank (government effec-
tiveness in 2001, GE; rule of law in 2000, RL; control over corruption indices—all available from 1996; they 
vary from -2.5 to +2.5, the higher, the better). We also used the investment climate index, available since 
1984 from the International Country Risk Guide (it varies from 0 to 100, the higher the better investment 
climate; IC- average investment climate index for 1984-90, and IC2000—for 2000).
The caveats of using these subjective indices for measuring institutional capacity are well known. 
The capacity of the state is the ability to enforce its rules and regulations, the ability to force individuals and 
companies to comply with these regulations, so a good natural objective measures of the institutional capac-
ity are murder rate (non-compliances with the monopoly on violence) and the share of shadow economy 
(non-compliance with tax, customs, safety, and other regulations). The crime rate would be a good indicator 
as well, but crimes are registered differently in various countries, so higher crimes rates in Western countries 
are believed to be the result of under-registration of crimes in poorer countries. But grave crimes, especially 
murders, are reasonable well registered even in less developed countries.
As fig. 1 suggests, index of investment climate and corruption perception index are quite correlated 
with the murder rate, although there are important inconsistencies and possibly—biases. It is possible to 
show, for instance, that out of two countries with the same murder rate (or the share of shadow economy), 
government effectiveness is higher in a more democratic country. 4
4  GE2002 =1.36 - 0.03MURDER2002 - 0.22DEMaver - 0.08DEM02 
           (-4.83)                (-4.93)           (-2.11) 
Adj R-squared = 0.52, Number of obs. = 186, T-statistics in brackets, significance - 4% or less.
  GE2002 – government effectiveness index in 2002 (ranges fro -2.5 to +2.5, the higher, the better), 
MURDER2002 – murder rate per 100,000 inhabitantsin 2002,  
DEMaver and DEM02 – levels of authoritarianism: average for 1972-2002 and in 2002 respectively (index of political 
rights from the Freedom House; ranges fro 1 to 7, the higher the more authoritarian).
  Same result holds for all 6 subjective indices (not only for government effectiveness, but rule of law, control over 
corruption, regulation quality, voice and accountability, political stability) and also if the shadow economy is used 
instead of the murder rate as an objective indicator of the capacity of the state.6  DESA Working Paper No. 93
Figure 1: 
Risk index (ICRG), Corruption perception index (CPI) and murder rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2002
Nevertheless, 
we use institutional 
indices as a more con-
ventional measure that 
is normally used in 
the literature (murder 
rate and the share of 
shadow economy are 
normally not regarded 
widely accepted prox-
ies for the institutional 
capacity).
Proven reserves and production of hydrocarbons are taken from the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, June 2006 5, whereas data on sub-soil assets6 are from Kunte et al (1998). Overall, we consider five 
main indicators of resource abundance:
EXfuel –  •	 share of fuel in exports in 1960-99, %.
Imfuel •	  – average ratio of net import of fuel to total import in 1960-99, % 
Prodf – •	  production of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent. 
ResOG •	  – proven reserves of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent.
SSA –  •	 sub-soil assets per capita in $ US in 1994 [Kunte et al., 1998].
The correlation coefficients between these indicators are shown in table 1. All of them are significant 
at 1% level. Even though the number of countries for which data on all 5 indicators are available is only 26, 
the coefficients and significance do not change much, when correlation is computed between any 2 indica-
tors from the list of 5 for a larger group of countries.
Table 1: 
Different indicators of resource abundance – correlation coefficients
  Prodf ResOG Exfuel Imfuel SSA
Prodf 1.0000
ResOG 0.8110 1.0000
Exfuel 0.5776 0.6885 1.0000
Imfuel – 0.5630 – 0.6871 – 0.9724 1.0000
SSA 0.8575 0.9921 0.6701 – 0.6727 1.0000
5  These data are available at the BP site: http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2006/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/spreadsheets/statistical_
review_full_report_workbook_2006.xls (see also : http://www.bp.com/multipleimagesection.do?categoryId=9011001
&contentId=7021619).
6  Sub-soil assets per capita is the sum of discounted rent (difference between world prices and costs) for the period of the 

















































































Source: WDI, WHO, Transparency International.Resource abundance: A curse or blessing?          7
It should be noted that correlation between reserves and production is quite high, whereas the 
correlation between exports (net or total), on the one hand, and production and reserves per capita, on the 
other, is noticeably lower. This is explained by different fuel per capita consumption in countries at different 
stages of development – rich countries consume several times more fuel and energy per person than develop-
ing countries. For instance, at the current average annual level of energy consumption of Western countries 
(about 5 tons of oil equivalent per capita, and even 8 tons in US and Canada) some well known fuel export-
ers, like Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Mexico, Russia, would not be exporters because their fuel production would 
be just enough to cover domestic consumption (Figure 2).
Figure 2: 
Fuel production per capita, kg of oil equivalent, 2005, top countries
In subsequent regressions, 
we include only countries that 
produce fuel (69 countries), have 
reserves of fuel (57), and export 
fuel (181); other countries are not 
included into regressions.
A complete description of 
notations used in the paper is given 
in Appendix.
Macroeconomic indicators in 
resource rich countries
A priori, it is not clear how re-
source abundance influences 
macroeconomic indicators. On the 
one hand, high export revenues fa-
cilitate the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserve (provided that 
the monetary authorities are will-
ing to do it—either with the fixed 
exchange rate regime or with the 
dirty float) and high investment. 
On the other hand, a temptation 
arises due to a false sense of secu-
rity or over confidence to borrow 
and to spend too much, so that unfavourable change of world prices or other conditions may result in a 
crisis. Below we investigate which of two tendencies dominates on balance.
Inflation and budget surplus: It turns out that higher per capita fuel production is associated with lower 
inflation, after controlling for the level of income Y75 7:
7  We use standard notation of coefficient significance: * - the 10% significance level, ** - the 5% significance level, *** - 
the 1% significance level.
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lnInf = – 0. 00673 Y75 – 2.880362** Prodf + 2.88036*** , 
R-squared = 0. 15083, N = 41,
where Inf – average annual inflation in 1975-99, %; lnInf- natural logarithm of Inf.
The negative impact on inflation persists, even if we control for the level of investment climate in 
the middle of the period. The coefficient of determination in this case becomes much higher, but the coef-
ficient characterizing the impact on inflation declines, because inflation is negatively correlated with the 
investment climate:
lnInf = 0. 0163441** Y75 – 0.0568581* Prodf – 0.0576217*** IC + 5.581482***, 
R-squared = 0.4267, N = 41
Where IC is investment climate that is used here as a proxy for institutional quality.
Using the share of fuel in exports as an indicator of resource abundance, we were able to reveal an 
institutional threshold by introducing the interaction variable - EXfuel*IC, share of fuel in total exports mul-
tiplied by the index of investment climate : if IC > 49.9, exports of fuel leads to lower inflation, otherwise 
it stimulates inflation. 49.9% - this is roughly the level of the investment climate in 1984-90 in Argentina, 
Egypt, Pakistan, Philippines:
lnInf = – 0. 0081041*** Y75 – 0. 0007026*** EXfuel*IC + 0. 0350539*** EXfuel + 2.805611***= 
R-squared = 0.1420, N = 86
This equation can be re-arranged by taking EXfuel out of the brackets, so as to make the threshold explicit:
lnInf =– 0. 0081041*** Y75 – 0. 0350539*** EXfuel (49.9 – IC***) + 2.805611***
When IC is included into the last equation as a linear variable, it is significant and negative, but the 
export of fuel variable looses its significance. Last regression works with and without D, the average govern-
ment debt to GDP ratio in 1975-99, and with Prodf instead of EXfuel.
The threshold level of investment climate is no more than a general principle that suggests that the 
quality of macroeconomic policy depends on institutional capacity: if this capacity is low, chances are that 
governments would not be able to capture the revenues from increased fuel exports and use these revenues 
for balancing the budget and lowering inflation. And this threshold may vary for different countries. The 
point is, however, that increased resource revenues do not automatically lead to low inflation; in order to 
benefit from the increased resource revenues the country should have a minimal state capacity to distribute 
these revenues in public interests.
Similar relationship exists between resource abundance and budget surplus. Controlling for the 
investment climate index and the level of government debt, the higher share of fuel in exports is associated 
with higher budget surpluses (lower deficits):
BS = 0. 0504827**IC + 0. 0360348 ** EXfuel - 0. 0549348* D– 5.146773***, 
R-squared = 0. 3825, N = 92.Resource abundance: A curse or blessing?          9
The exclusion of the IC indicator leads to the decrease of the EXfuel coefficient – an additional evi-
dence that Exfuel negatively influences IC. If, instead of IC, we control for initial GDP per capita, Ycap75, 
this indicator turns out to be insignificant. However, EXfuel keeps its significance in this regression as well:
BS = 0.0000425Ycap75 + 0. 0496239**EXfuel – 0. 0166082*D – 2.123727**, 
R-squared = 0.3916, N = 88, 
where BS is the average ratio of government surplus to GDP in % in 1975-99, 
D is the average government debt to GDP ratio in % in 1975-99.
Per capita production of fuel is also positively linked to the budget surplus:
BS = - 0. 026311Y75 + 0. 2669832* Prodf - 0.0293449***D– 2.110485**, 
R-squared = 0.2811, N= 35.
So, resource abundance actually helps to balance the budget and to stabilize prices. This conclusion, 
of course, is true only in the “average case”. Countries like Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE had very low inflation (some—Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia—even experienced deflation in 
1984-91), whereas Angola, Bolivia, Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela experienced periods of high inflation. As 
fig. 3 suggests, inflation rates are strongly correlated with the investment climate index (as well as with other 
measures of institutional capacity, such as corruption index, government effectiveness index, etc.).
Figure 3. 
Average investment climate index in 1984-90 and average annual inflation in 1975-99, %
Domestic investment: One has 
to expect that resource rent 
increases savings that under 
reasonably good institutions 
could be transformed into 
higher investment. In linear 
regressions resource abundance 
affects the share of investment 
in GDP positively. Similar 
results were obtained for the 
other measures of resource 
abundance—export of fuel, 
resource rent and sub-soil as-
sets. Only the proven reserves 
turn out to be insignificant for 
explaining the share of invest-
ment in GDP.
Foreign direct investment: The relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and resource export and 
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initial per capita income, Y75, and population density, Popdens, we obtain that FDI, net annual average inflow 
of foreign direct investment as a % of GDP in 1980-99, is positively linked to export and production of fuel:
FDI = – 0. 0189986 ***Y75 + 0. 0007759*** Popdens + 0. 0099592 * EXfuel + 1.404243***, 
R-squared = 0. 4131, N = 52.
FDI = – 0.0278247*** Y75 - 0.0028366***Popdens + 0.0558353*** Prodf + 2.14422***, 
R-squared = 0.5517, N = 25.
Perhaps, fuel is so important that foreign companies are willing to invest in its production and 
export even in countries with poor investment climate, corruption, etc.? We cannot say for sure, because the 
relationship between FDI and ResOG, proven reserves of oil and gas per capita, is actually negative:
FDI = – 0.0404418*** Y75 – 0.0041042***Popdens – 0.0004962***ResOG + 3.460264***, 
R-squared = 0.5305, N = 27.
Income inequality: Income inequalities, Ineq, in resource exporting countries turn out to be lower, even after 
controlling for PPP GDP per capita in 1995, Y95, density of the population, PopDens, area and population of 
the country, AREA, POP, communist past, TRANS (dummy variable), and level of authoritarianism, DEM.
Ineq = -0.001*** Y95 + 0.002* PopDens - 1.21(10-08)* POP + 1.25(10-06)***AREA - 10.09*** TRANS - 
1.57*DEM - 0.06**EXfuel + 54.4*** 
N= 115, R-squared = 0.4406, 
where 
Ineq – GINI coefficient in the latest available year of the period 1993-2003, 
DEM – average level of authoritarianism (1 to 7) according to Freedom House, in 1970-2002.
The result also holds if one excludes DEM from the regression as well as for a number of other 
modifications of the regression model.
Note that our result contradicts the conclusions of another study (Gylfason, Zoega, 2002) claiming 
that resource abundance is the factor that contributes to inequalities. But this study used another indicator 
of resource abundance (the share of natural resources in total wealth of the country from the discussed paper 
- Kunte et al, 1998, that estimates the value of sub-soil assets). It could be that governments in resource 
exporting countries have more possibilities to decrease income inequality due to appropriate distribution of 
resource rent.
Institutions
If resource rich countries have a number of advantages—responsible macroeconomic policies (low budget defi-
cits and inflation), higher level of domestic and foreign investment, and lower income inequalities, why cannot 
these advantages be transformed into higher growth? Botswana and Malaysia may be the only examples of re-
source rich developing countries that were successfully catching up with the rich countries club, but if we look 
only at fuel (not all resources) exporters, the picture is even more discouraging. Why not a single major exporter 
of fuel had become a case of “growth miracle”, showing sustained growth rates comparable to that of Japan, 
Taiwan, and South Korea in the 1950s-1980s? As a matter of fact, out of major fuel exporters only Indonesia 
experienced high growth rates in 1967-97 (per capita GDP grew at an annual average rate of 3,9%, whereas Resource abundance: A curse or blessing?          11
annual population growth rate was about 2%, so that annual average growth of GDP was about 6% for three 
decades. The share of oil and gas in Indonesian exports increased in this period from 35% in 1960-68 to nearly 
80% in 1974-83, but then fell to 23% in 1994-97 (22% in 2005)—(Van der Eng, 2002). According to WDI, 
Indonesian per capita PPP GDP increased from 5.7% of the US level in 1975 to 10.4% in 1997.8
There is a large body of literature that links economic performance to institutional quality. Could 
the failure of many resource rich countries to achieve sustained rapid growth be due to low quality institu-
tions? Does resource abundance influence the quality of institutions? Some authors (Alexeev, Conrad, 2005) 
claim that there is no link, whereas others (Kartashov, 2006; Chystyakov, 2006) find a more subtle non-
linear relationship—no impact of resources on institutions for rich countries with good institutions (or even 
a positive impact) and a negative impact for countries with bad institutions. Possible mechanisms of such an 
impact were discussed in the literature more than once. First, resource abundance creates stimuli to fight for 
resource rent—this struggle becomes possible under weak institutions and, as a result, weakens them even 
more. Second, the outflow of resources from secondary manufacturing and high tech industries into resource 
sector inhibits the growth of human capital, which in turn poses obstacles for the perfection of institutions. 
Third, high budget revenues from resource sector make governments less willing to invest into the creation of 
strong institutions (less stimuli to fight corruption, for instance, since revenues are readily available).
As was stated earlier, we define state institutions as the ability of the government to enforce rules and 
regulations, contracts and property rights included. Strong institutions are a key factor of growth (Rodrik, 
Subramanian, Trebbi, 2002), but of course not the only one. Manufacturing growth is like cooking a good 
dish—all the necessary ingredients should be in the right proportion; if only one is under- or overrepresented, 
the “chemistry of growth” will not happen. Fast economic growth can materialize in practice only if several 
necessary conditions are met simultaneously. In particular, rapid growth requires a number of crucial inputs—
infrastructure, human capital, even land distribution in agrarian countries, strong state institutions, and eco-
nomic stimuli among other things. Once one of the essential ingredients is missing, growth just does not take 
off. Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2008) talk about “binding constraints” that hold back economic growth; 
finding these constraints is a task in “growth diagnostics.” In some cases, these constraints are associated with a 
lack of market liberalization, in others, with a lack of state capacity or human capital or infrastructure.
The genesis of institutions (and the determinants of institutional capacity) is too big an issue and is 
not considered in this paper. Instead we limit ourselves to a more modest analysis of the relationship between 
institutional capacity and resource abundance.
The best result we were able to get is the following threshold relationship:
IC2000 = 14.96963***Y75 + 0. 0122836***Popdens + 0.2735595***ICr + 0.0151996***Prodf∙ IC - 0. 
8323285*** Prodf + 46.58238*** 
R-squared = 0.6159, N = 44, 
where 
IC2000 - investment climate index in 2000, 
IC – average investment climate index in 1984-90 
ICr – “residual” investment climate index, calculated as a residual from linear regression of IC on Y75, PPP 
GDP per capita in 1975.
8  However, after the currency crisis of 1997, Indonesian GDP fell dramatically and only ten years later surpassed the 
pre-recession level.12  DESA Working Paper No. 93
Rewriting this equation in the form, making the institutional threshold explicit, we get:
IC2000 = Control + a(IC – 54.8) Prodf.
So, if IC < 54,8 (level of Algeria, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Kenya, Qatar, UAE), export of fuel has a negative 
impact on the subsequent quality of institutions.
If we control for per capita GDP, the impact of resource exports and production on other indicators 
of the quality of institutions (GE, RL, CC, CPI) is negative, but no threshold could be found. The impact of 
deposits (reserves) is insignificant (significant only for CC – control over corruption index).
It should be noted that some resource rich countries have relatively high indicators of the quality of 
institutions. For instance, in Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, not to speak about Norway, the quality 
of institutions is comparable to that of Italy. The worst institutional indicators are observed in Angola, Iraq, 
and Nigeria.
If the threshold relationship really exists, it means that countries that have good institutions may not 
need a special industrial policy to discourage the development of the resource sector. The market with good 
institutions works and allocates resources in an optimal way. However, if institutions are poor to begin with, 
leaving it to the market to allocate capital and labor between manufacturing and resource sector can result in 
excessive resource orientation, which in turn would undermine institutional capacity and hinder growth.
With regards to human capital, it turns out that under weak institutions, high production of fuel 
does not help to improve educational levels. As the following regression equation suggests, higher produc-
tion of fuel in countries with investment climate index below 70 (this threshold basically separates developed 
countries from developing) has a negative impact on the level of human capital:
HC = 0.0664327***Y75 + 1.925845***TRANS + 0.0078357***Prodf∙IC –0.5880474*** Prodf + 
3.234807*** 
R-squared = 0.7276, N = 39, 
where 
HC– number of years of education per person among people over 25 years old, average for 1975-99.
Industrial policy
The most important features of industrial policy in resource abundant countries are the maintenance of the 
low domestic energy and fuel prices (via export taxes and direct restrictions on export) and the overvaluation 
of the exchange rate. As was argued earlier, this combination is a very unfortunate one—low domestic fuel 
prices discourage energy efficiency, whereas overvalued exchange rate hinders growth. The latter—overvalued 
exchange rate—is not usually considered as an instrument of industrial policy, but in fact it is exactly that. 
As shown in Polterovich and Popov (2002, 2004), the levels and rates of growth of foreign exchange reserves 
(FOREX) vary greatly among countries, even after controlling for the objective factors of accumulation of re-
serves, such as the ratio of trade to GDP, the volatility of trade, the quality of institutions, the GDP per capita, 
level of external debt.9 These differences in the speed of reserve accumulation—the policy induced rate of ac-
cumulation of reserves (i.e. after controlling for objective factors)—turned out to be very informative for the 
9  We tried to regress the increase of foreign exchange reserves to GDP ratios on other factors, including capital flows, 
government debt, short term capital flows, but they proved to be insignificant, see (Polterovich, Popov, 2004). Resource abundance: A curse or blessing?          13
explanation of cross-country variations in growth rates: whereas for the developed countries the accumulation 
of reserves in excess of objective needs was detrimental for growth, for developing countries, this accumulation 
had a strong positive impact on growth even after controlling for the usual variables in growth regressions, 
such as initial income, the quality of the institutions, population growth rates, investment/GDP ratios. Ac-
cumulation of reserves, of course, is associated with costs. When reserves are accumulated, they are not spent, 
so the opportunity cost could be very high in terms of not using them for building infrastructure. The returns 
on investment into US or other developed countries government securities are very low as compared to the 
returns in developing countries (Rodrik, 2005).But the other effect—stimuli for the export oriented growth—
seems to provide benefits that are greater than costs.
Real exchange rate (RER) is usually considered as an exogenous variable (in the long term), but the 
fact is that differences among countries in the rates of accumulation of reserves lead to dramatic variations in 
the level of real exchange rates, even after controlling for the GDP per capita (to capture the Balassa-Samuel-
son effect). The policy of undervaluation of real exchange rate via accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
thus results in disequilibrium (under-priced) exchange rate—this effect is quite large and is sometimes 
called “exchange rate protectionism”.10 The reason that such a policy spurs growth is at least twofold. First, 
it allows reaping externalities from exports, especially manufacturing and high-tech exports, providing extra 
protection to the domestic producers of all tradable goods, increasing their competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign 
producers, and reorienting them towards export markets. For developed countries manufacturing export to 
GDP ratios may be already at the optimal level, whereas for the developing countries they are still low, so 
special government efforts are needed to raise them to optimum. Second, rapid accumulation of reserves pro-
vides a signal to the foreign investors (that the government is strong) and also under-prices domestic assets, 
so that there is an additional inflow of foreign direct investment that contributes to growth. In Polterovich 
and Popov (2002, 2004) we offer a model that demonstrates how these effects work and provide empirical 
evidence that countries that accumulate excess reserves have lower real exchange rates, higher growth of ex-
port and trade to GDP ratios (apparently due to higher manufacturing exports), higher investment to GDP 
ratios and eventually grow faster. Rodrik (2007) provides evidence that countries with undervalued exchange 
rates do indeed grow faster.
Theoretically, the same effect can be reached via imposition of import duties and export subsidies 
(that was a policy of a number of fast growing countries, especially in East Asia), but the advantage of 
undervaluation of the exchange rate via reserves accumulation is that this latter policy is not selective and 
hence can be effective even with poor institutions and poor quality of bureaucracy. As argued in Polterovich 
and Popov (2004), there is empirical evidence that the effectiveness of import tariffs depends on the qual-
ity of institutions, whereas the “exchange rate protectionism” works in all poor countries, even with poor 
institutional capacity.
 Irrespective of the existence of the long term impact of undervaluation of real exchange rate on 
growth, most economists would agree that the exchange rate should be at least not overvalued, like it often 
10  The following equation links growth rates, y, with policy induced accumulation of reserves, Rpol: 
y = CONST. + CONTR. VAR. + Rpol (0.10 – 0.0015Ycap75us)      
R2 = 0.56, N=70, all variables are significant at 10% level or less,  
where Ycap75us – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level; control variables are population, 
population density, and population growth rates, inflation.  
It turns out that there is a threshold level of GDP per capita in 1975 – about 67% of the US level: 
countries below this level could stimulate growth via accumulation of FER in excess of objective needs, 
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happens in resource exporting countries (Dutch disease). Below we provide evidence that resource abundant 
countries really have higher real exchange rates and this has a predictable negative effect on growth. However, 
at the same time these countries usually keep relatively low domestic prices for fuel and energy that has two 
effects on growth: negative (due to higher energy intensity, resulting in energy waste) and positive (due to the 
higher competitiveness of domestic producers enjoying low energy costs), and the second, stimulating, effect 
predominates (growth is higher in countries with low domestic fuel prices despite higher energy intensity).
Accumulation of FOREX and the level of RER: The data suggest that fuel exporting countries have more 
FOREX in months of import than the other countries:
FOREX_IM = 0.0014471* EXfuel + 0.2827523, 
R-squared = 0.0279, N = 162, 
where FOREX_IM – average ratio of FOREX to monthly import for 1960-99.
Reserves were also positively and significantly correlated with other indicators of resource abundance 
– production of fuel, proven reserves of oil and gas, and sub-soil assets: 
FOREX_IM = 5.58*10-6*** SSA + 0.3174006, 
R-squared = 0.0388, N = 77, 
where SSA –«sub-soil assets» in 1994, dollars, per capita.
However, the accumulation of reserves in resource abundant countries proceeded more slowly than 
in other economies, even though to avoid the “Dutch disease” they had to accumulate reserves faster:
FOREXgr = -10.25**FOREX_IMP -4.01**logY75 – 0.13**EXfuel + 20.55*** 
R-squared = 0.1979, N = 88, 
where FOREXgr – increase in reserves to GDP ratio in 1975-99, p.p.
One could imagine that resource rich countries employ other methods to avoid the overvaluation of 
the exchange rate, but the data do not support such a proposition. The ratio of domestic to the US prices is 
higher in countries exporting fuel:
RER = 25.88*** log Y75 + 0.33***TRADEav +0.33*** EXfuel – 39.07* , 
R-squared = 0.5255, N = 106, 
where RER – average ratio of domestic to the US prices for the period of 1980-99, %, 
TRADEav – average ratio of the value of external trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99, %.
Another regression equation with higher R2 suggests that there is a threshold on investment climate 
index, IC – if IC < 69.7% (i.e. in developing countries mostly) export of fuel leads to the appreciation of RER:
RER = 0,23** Y75 +1,38***IC + 2,23*** EXfuel – 0,032***IC . EXfuel – 31,99*** , 
R-squared = 0.6097, N = 92.
This regression demonstrates that countries with bad institutions are normally not able to avoid 
Dutch disease. Note, however, that similar regressions show that other resource abundance indicators do not 
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Low domestic fuel prices: Whereas resource rich countries have generally overvalued exchange rate (Dutch 
disease), they also maintain a relatively low level of domestic prices for fuel. This is another important instru-
ment of industrial policy that has at least two implications: first, like the undervaluation of the RER, low 
domestic prices for fuel provide competitive advantages to domestic producers and stimulate exports and 
production (especially of energy intensive products); second, low fuel prices lead to energy waste, hence, 
higher energy intensity and higher costs. Which effect predominates?
We find that resource rich countries normally maintain lower level of domestic fuel prices:
PFuel = – 5.19 ∙10-6** Area – 0.0969954 PopDens – 0.1293359** ResOG + 133.2401*** 
R2 = 0.2261, N = 25, 
where 
PFuel – ratio of domestic fuel price to US fuel prices as a % of similar ratio for all prices in 1993; 
Area – area of a country, sq. km; 
PopDens – density of population in 1999, persons per 1 sq. km.
It is especially true for resource rich countries with the poor investment climate (IC<64.4): the 
higher the share of fuel in exports the lower are domestic fuel prices:
PFuel = - 0.015*** PopDens - 2.028*** IC - 4.087***EXfuel + 0.063** ExfueIC + 261.81*** , 
or 
PFuel = Contr. + a(IC- 64.4)EXfuel 
R-squared = 0.24; N = 55.
Lower energy prices are associated with lower efficiency of energy use. Energy efficiency, EnEff, is 
higher in countries with higher energy prices:
EnEff = 1.428463* logY75 + 3.20 ∙10-7*** Area + 0.024037** Pop + 0.0100001* PFuel 
– 0.0910948** Ind + 4.024574* 
R-squared = 0.2572, N = 43, 
where 
EnEff – PPP GDP per one kg of used fuel (oil equivalent), dollars, average in 1975-99; 
Ind – share of industry in GDP in 1995, %; 
Pop - population of a country, average for 1980-99, million persons.
It can be also shown that energy efficiency is lower in fuel producing and exporting countries11:
EnEff = 1.441066* log(Y75) – (1.6∙10-7)* Area + 0.024037** Pop – 0.0763032*** Prodf + 3.59584***, 
R-squared = 0.1821, N = 44.
EnEff = 1.55**log(Y75) -0.017*POP – 0.024** EXfuel - 1.75***TRANS - 300.53*** (Y99/Area) + 
0.006***PopDens + 0.50, 
R-squared = 0.2568; N = 78, 
where 
11  This higher energy intensity in fuel producing countries can be caused by the more energy intensive industrial structure 
(fuel industries are capital and energy intensive), as well as by differences in the territory, density of population 
(transportation costs), climate. A more careful comparison is needed to control for objective conditions. 16  DESA Working Paper No. 93
TRANS - dummy for transition economies, 
Y99/Area – ratio of PPP GDP in 1999 per 1 square km of national territory.
If the indicator Y99/Area is omitted, EXfuel keeps its significance though logY75 looses it.
However, low domestic fuel prices lead to higher growth. This negative correlation is in fact vis-
ible at the chart below (Figure 4), and more accurate calculations provide additional evidence – control-
ling for the initial income, the size of the country (population), and the quality of institutions, it turns out 
that growth rates depend negatively on the level of domestic fuel prices, i.e. lower prices are associated with 
higher growth rates:
y = 0.14*** IC – 0.063 *** Y75 + 0.006** Pop – 0.011*** PFuel – 3.72***, 
R-squared = 0.5217, N = 50, 
where 
y – annual average growth rates of GDP per capita in 1975-99, %.
Figure 4: 
Relative fuel prices (ratio of domestic to US fuel prices as a % of same ratio for all goods) 
and annual average growth rates of GDP per capita in 1975-99, %
When controlling for energy efficiency, the coefficient of PFuel increases:
y = 0.13*** IC – 0.06*** Y75 + 0.0048* Pop – 0.013*** PFuel +0.318*** EnEff – 4.13***. 
R-squared = 0. 7183, N = 46,
y = 0. 0686575*** IC – 0. 2.472695***logY75 – 0. 6679008*** n + 0. 0005785*** PopDens + 0. 
0028251*** Pop + 0. 1499302* EnEff – 0. 8659693, 
R-squared = 0. 5349, N = 76.
That is to say that low domestic fuel prices affect growth positively (via increased competitiveness of 
domestic producers) and negatively (via energy waste), but the first effect predominates.
Source: WDI.
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Adding other control variables to the right hand side does not ruin the regression:
y = 0. 1297457 *** IC – 0. 0666434*** Y75 – 0. 0140655*** PFuel + 
0. 3219971*** EnEff + 1.22e-07** Area –0. 8560763** TRANS – 3.889959***, 
R-squared = 0. 7152, N = 45, 
where TRANS- dummy variable for transition economies.
It is also of interest to note, that R&D spending is higher in countries with low domestic fuel prices:
RD = 0.0106823*Y75 – 0. 226082** IC – 0. 0022511** PFuel +0. 4840302** TRANS – 0.7641969 , 
R-squared = 0. 73116, N = 37, 
where 
RD- average ratio of R&D spending to GDP in 1980-99, %.
Or, a similar equation with more control variables:
RD = 0. 0098996*Y75 + 0. 0285666* IC – 0. 0019651* PFuel+ 0. 6071381 ** TRANS 
– 0. 0000719*PopDens –4.99e-08 ** Area +0. 004741*** Pop – 1.288969***, 
R-squared = 0. 7991, N = 37.
The interpretation of this relationship could be that there probably exists the correlation between 
different instruments of industrial policy: countries that try to diversify their export and promote growth 
keep domestic fuel prices low and also support research and development. Low domestic fuel prices allow 
supporting national producers without resorting to import tariffs—there is a significant positive correlation 
between the level of fuel prices and import tariffs (R = 0.39).
Low domestic fuel prices and the quality of institutions
In the following regressions we try to put together both sets of explanatory variables—the ones that charac-
terize the quality of institutions and the ones that measure the relative level of domestic fuel prices. We get a 
number of threshold relationships that generally suggest that fuel exports hinders growth in countries with 
poor quality of institutions, whereas low level of fuel prices has a stimulating effect on growth irrespective of 
the quality of institutions:
y = – 0. 83***n – 0. 0006 *** Y75 + 0. 00031*** PopDens + 0. 059** IC + 0.0078 *** Pop + 
0.00087*EXfuel∙IC – 0.058* EXfuel – 0. 011 *** PFuel – 2.60***TRANS + 2.35, 
R-squared = 0. 6499, N = 47.
Or, rewriting it in the form that makes the threshold explicit:
y = Contr – 0.011***PFuel+ 0.00087*EXfuel (IC – 65.8).
This relationship suggests that with poor institutions (IC < 65.8, close to the threshold were Cyprus, 
Hungary, Malaysia, Thailand), export of fuel (EXfuel) is associated with lower growth, whereas the lower the 
level of relative domestic fuel prices, the higher is growth.
To test the robustness of the last equation, we experimented with different control and explanatory 
variables, such as the ratio of investment to GDP, Inv; human capital, HC; production of fuel per capita, 
Prodf, instead of export of fuel, EXfuel; corruption perception index, CPI, instead of index of investment 
climate, IC; ratio of fuel prices to clothing and footwear prices as compared to the same ratio in the US, PF/
PCl, instead of PFuel—ratio of national fuel prices to the US fuel price. The resulting equations are reported 18  DESA Working Paper No. 93
below—it appears that the relationship is quite robust and explains sometimes up to 90% of all cross-coun-
try variations in growth rates:
y= 0.152***Inv – 0.604**n – 0.026***Y75 + 0.006***Pop + 0.0014***EXfuel*IC –0.1030835***EXfuel – 0. 
0146979***PFuel – 3.924994*** TRANS + 2. 114804 
R-squared = 0. 7396, N = 48.
With a different indicator of institutional quality:
y = – 1.451*** n – 0. 0480181***Y75 + 0.0066** Pop + 0. 00043*** PopDens + 
0.006** EXfuel∙ CPI – 0. 0399* EXfuel – 0. 0137** PFuel – 3. 796*** TRANS + 7.678***, 
R-squared = 0. 7080, N = 30, 
where 
EXfuel∙CPI – interaction term (multiple of the share of fuel in total export and corruption perception index). 
Here the threshold level of CPI (CPI > 6.6) was close to the actual level in countries like Chile, Malaysia, Spain.
With production of fuel instead of export:
y = – 0.0638591*** Y75 + 0.0769304** IC + 0.0049113* POP – 1.05178* n – 2.781959*** TRANS – 
0.0069054 PFuel + 0.0043451** Prodf ∙IC – 0.3640217** Prodf + 1.887194. 
R-squared = 0.7429, N = 27.
y = – 0.0779992*** Y75 + 0.5354141*** HC – 0.0009169* PopDens + 0.0025545* POP – 1.058412*** n – 
4.799443*** TRANS – 0.0108899*** Pfuel + 0.010235*** Prodf ∙IC – 0.9241075*** Prodf + 5.460552***. 
R-squared = 0.9218, N = 24.
The R-squared in this latter regression is astonishingly high – 92%, but the number of observations 
is only 24, so the regression may not be considered reliable. However, it is quite robust: exclusion of some 
variables, like POP, PopDens, TRANS, Pfuel, does not destroy the relationship:
y = – 0.0635*** Y75 + 0.3260514* HC – 1.140682** n + 0.0094633*** Prodf ∙IC – 0.7770783*** Prodf + 
4.465173*** 
R-squared = 0.4977, N = 38.
With a different indicator of the relative fuel prices:
y = 0. 944***n – 0. 0275***Y75 + 0.00799***Pop + 0. 00049***Popdens + 0.00125***EXfuel∙IC – 
0.0798***EXfuel – 0.0092**PF/PCl – 2.769***TRANS + 5.095***, 
R-squared = 0. 5880, N = 47,
Same, but with investment/GDP ratio and without population density:
y = 0.137***Inv – 0.568n – 0.0234***Y75 + 0.00699***Pop + 0.0013**EXfuel∙IC – 0.09296*** EXfuel – 0. 
010621*** PF/PCl – 3.393*** TRANS + 1.717 
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Adding the index of residual investment climate, ICr (calculated as a residual from linear regression 
of IC on Y75, PPP GDP per capita in 1975) as a linear term, we get pretty much the same results—only the 
significance of the interaction term falls to 13%.
Using the alternative indicators of the resource abundance (production instead of export of fuel) and 
relative fuel prices (PF/PCl instead of Pfuel), we get the following threshold regressions:
y = – 0.0290086*** Y75 + 0.0947086*** ICr – 0.6805491 n – 2.297492*** TRANS 
– 0.01295*** PF/PCl + 0.0039714** Prodf ∙IC – 0.3602921** Prodf + 5.463706*** 
R-squared = 0.7869, N = 27.
y = – 0.0163475** Y75 + 0.1199287*** ICr – 1.207602*** TRANS – 0.0167533*** PF/PCl + 0.0039267*** 
Prodf ∙IC – 0.3752063*** Prodf + 4.23377*** 
R-squared = 0.7532, N = 27.
y = – 0.0580233*** Y75 + 0.4207379*** HC + 0.0503021* ICr – 0.4864664* n 
– 3.32293*** TRANS – 0.01316*** PF/PCl + 0.00767*** Prodf ∙IC – 0.7065034*** Prodf 
+ 4.295662*** 
R-squared = 0.9277, N = 24.
We were not able to find a good regression equation, if RER is added to the right hand side as 
another explanatory variable together with the ones already mentioned—the RER in this case turns out to 
be insignificant, even though the sign of the coefficient is “correct” (negative). The explanation could be 
that the RER is positively correlated with the quality of the institutions, even after controlling for the GDP 
per capita so it is difficult to distinguish between the impact on growth of these two factors—the quality of 
institutions and the level of RER. As the chart below suggests (Figure 5), the RER is higher in countries with 
the better “residual” (after controlling for the level of income) quality of institutions, ICres.
Figure 5: 
Residual index of investment climate in 1984-90 (after controlling for GDP per capita) and real exchange rate of 
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Low RER versus low domestic fuel prices
Undervaluation of RER has the same stimulating effect on growth as the low level of domestic fuel prices, so 
in a sense these two policies are substitutes:
y = -3.58***TRANS + 0.135***Inv – 0.00045***Y75 + 0. 0053**Pop + 0.11***IC – 0.578*n - 
0.0136***PFuel –0.0178***RER – 4.006 
R-squared = 0. 6819, N = 50,
It is also important that these two policies are both largely non-selective—they give advantages 
to most producers. However, both policies are costly. Low domestic fuel prices result in energy waste and 
stimulate exports of energy intensive products, not high-tech products that usually have very low energy in-
tensity. Undervaluation of RER is usually connected with foreign exchange reserve accumulation that means 
the waste of resources as well.
If one excludes investment from the last regression then RER looses its significance most probably 
because RER decrease may require extraction of resources out of the economy (accumulation of FER).
It can be shown that the increase in external trade/GDP ratio was the fastest in countries that under-
priced their RER most:
TRADEgr = 0.0063***Y75 + 0.1047*** POP – 0.4984***RER + 4.86 
R-squared = 0.2402, N = 93, 
where 
TRADEgr – increase in the share of foreign trade in PPP GDP in1980-99, p.p.
According to the equation above, even controlling for the size (POP) and level of development (Y75) 
of the country, the strongest growth of external trade to GDP ratio was observed in countries with low real 
exchange rate.
In fact, because it was shown above that most resource rich countries suffered from the Dutch 
diseases (overvalued exchange rate), it can be expected that the growth of external trade was less pronounced 
in resource rich countries. The following equations for EXPgr (increase in the share of export in GDP in 
1960-99, p.p.) and TRADEgr (increase in the share of foreign trade in PPP GDP in1980-99, p.p.) confirm 
that this was indeed the case:
EXPgr = 0.64***EXPav + 0.14*** POP – 0.19** EXfuel -7.44** 
R-squared = 0.2956, N = 74, 
where EXPav – average share of export in GDP in 1960-99, %.
TRADEgr = 0.17***Y75 – 0.68***EXfuel – 5.1* 
R-squared = 0.3551, N = 90.
Meanwhile, recent research suggests that industrial policy aimed at stimulating hi-tech exports has 
important externalities for growth (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003; Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2006; 
Rodrik, 2006 ). To put it differently, export of resources and energy intensive goods is not so beneficial 
for growth as exports of high tech goods. From this point of view, it is better to underprice the exchange 
rate, not the domestic prices for fuel. However, in practice, as was already shown, most resource abundant 
countries keep high RER and low domestic fuel prices. Further research is needed to understand why it is 
the case and what the best compromise between these two options is.Resource abundance: A curse or blessing?          21
Conclusions
We were able to show that resource rich countries suffer from several shortcomings that may hinder their 
growth. First, the quality of their institutions is inferior to that in other countries—if a country had a 
poor institutional capacity to begin with, it is very likely to deteriorate in the future proportionately to the 
magnitude of resource export/production. Second, resource rich countries suffer from the Dutch disease—
overvaluation of the exchange rate that creates obstacles for exports, especially exports of high-tech goods, 
and hinders growth. To promote growth  resource rich countries generally keep domestic fuel prices at low 
level—this policy really helps to stimulate growth, but at a cost of high energy intensity. Resource rich coun-
tries also have relatively lower quality of human capital.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that resource rich countries grow less rapidly due to their resource 
wealth. This is explained by the fact that they pursue good policies in some areas and enjoy the advan-
tages of having resource rent. In particular, resource abundant economies have lower budget deficits and 
inflation, higher investment/GDP ratios, higher inflows of FDI as compared to GDP, and more equitable 
distribution of income.
Whereas it is difficult to improve the quality of institutions in the short run, it is theoretically pos-
sible to switch to a more promising industrial policy. One should keep RER low enough to promote high 
technology export and gradually raise fuel domestic prices to increase efficiency of energy use. Under weak 
institutions, government interference is always risky. However, this seems to be the only catching up strategy 
with a reasonable chance for success.
To conclude, in a typical resource country with typical shortcomings—poor institutions, low do-
mestic fuel prices and relatively overvalued RER,—the increase in domestic fuel and energy prices together 
with the lowering of RER seems to be desirable, but has to be gradual, carefully managed and supplemented 
by other appropriate industrial policies.
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Appendix: Notations
Macroeconomic variables
y   annual average growth rates of GDP per capita in 1975-99, %;
Y75    PPP GDP per capita in 1975 in $US;
Inv   share of investment in GDP, average for 1975-1999, %;
PopDens  density of population in 1999, persons per 1 sq. km;
n    annual average population growth rate in 1975-99, %;
Area    area of a country, sq. km;
Pop    population of a country, average for 1980-99, mln. persons;
Inf   inflation, geometric average for 1975-99 period, %;
BD    budget deficit (surplus, if with the “-“ sign), average for 1975-99, % of GDP;
FOREX_IM  average ratio of FOREX to monthly import for 1960-99;
RER    average ratio of domestic to the US prices for the period of 1980-99, %;
EXPgr    increase in the share of export in GDP in 1980-99, p.p.;
EXPav    average share of export in GDP in 1980-99, %;
TRADEgr  increase in the share of foreign trade in PPP GDP in1980-99, p.p.;
TRADEav  average ratio of the value of external trade to PPP GDP in 1980-99, %;
RD    average ratio of R&D spending to GDP in 1980-99, %;
Ineq    Gini index (of income or consumption distribution) for the latest year of the period 1990-   
    2005, % (WDI, 2006);
TRANS   dummy variable, equal to 1 for (post-) communist countries and to 0 otherwise;
FDI    annual average net inflow of foreign direct investment in 1980-99, % of GDP;Resource abundance: A curse or blessing?          25
EnEff    PPP GDP per one kg of used fuel (oil equivalent), dollars, average in 1975-99;
PFuel    ratio of domestic fuel price to US fuel prices as a % of similar ratio for all prices in 1993;
PF/PCl   ratio of domestic prices of fuel to prices of clothing and footwear in a particular country as a  
    % of the similar ratio in the US in 1993;
Ind    share of industry in GDP in 1995;
HC   number of years of education per person among people older 25, average for 1975-99.
Indicators of resource abundance
Rent    resource rent from mineral resources in 2001, % of GDP;
EXfuel    share of fuel in exports in 1960-99), %;
Imfuel    average ratio of net import of fuel to total import, %;
Prodf    production of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent;
ResOG   proven reserves of oil and gas per capita in 1980-1999, tons of oil equivalent;
SSA   sub-soil assets per capita in $ US in 1994 [Kunte et al.].
Indicators of the quality of institutions
RL   rule of law index in 2000 (World Bank 2002; Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, and Zoido-   
    Lobatón Pablo, 1999); based on opinion of experts and residents, varies from –2,5 to +2,5;   
    the higher, the better the rule of law;
IC2000   investment climate index in 2000;
IC    average investment climate index in 1984-90;
ICr   “residual” investment climate index, calculated as a residual from linear regression of IC on   
    Y75, PPP GDP per capita in 1975;
CPI   average corruption perception index for 1980-85 (Transparency International); changes    
    from 0 to 10; the lower, the higher corruption, so in fact it is the index of cleanness, not of  
    corruption;
CPI02-03  average corruption perception index for 2002-2003 (Transparency International);      
    changes from 0 to 10; the lower, the higher corruption, so in fact it is the index of      
    cleanness, not of corruption;
CC    control over corruption index (WDI, 2001; Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, and Lobatón    
    Pablo, 1999; World Bank Governance Indicators dataset , 2007 http://info.worldbank.org/   
    governance/kkz2005/tables.asp ); varies from –2,5 to +2,5; the higher, the better the control  
    over corruption;
GE    index of government effectiveness in 2001 (WDI, 2001; Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart, 
    and Zoido-Lobatón Pablo, 1999); varies from –2,5 to +2,5; the higher, the higher the 
    government effectiveness (World Bank Governance Indicators dataset , 2007 - http://info.   
    worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/tables.asp ).